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Abstract
Verified boot is an interesting feature of Chromium OS that sup-
posedly can detect any modification in the root file system (rootfs) by
a dedicated adversary. However, by exploiting a design flaw in veri-
fied boot, we show that an adversary can replace the original rootfs
by a malicious rootfs containing exploits such as a spyware or key-
logger and still pass the verified boot process. The exploit is based
on the fact that a dedicated adversary can replace the rootfs and the
corresponding verification information in the bootloader. We exper-
imentally demonstrate an attack using both the base and developer
version of Chromium OS in which the adversary installs a spyware in
the target system to send cached user data to the attacker machine in
plain text which are otherwise encrypted, and thus inaccessible. We
also demonstrate techniques to mitigate this vulnerability.
1 Introduction
Chromium OS [5] is a web-centric operating system with Chromium browser
as its principal user interface. It is designed for the users who often spend
considerable amount of time on the Internet. Since the system is primarily
optimized with components to support the browser, it can boot really fast
( 10 seconds).
The Chromium OS design document [9] discusses the following use cases
for Chromium devices: (i) ubiquitous computing, (ii) use as a secondary
entertainment computer, (iii) lending device to the customers of coffee shops
and libraries, and (iv) sharing a common computer among family members.
Since sharing a device among multiple users is one of the intended use
cases, Chromium OS is designed to support scenarios such that one user
(even the owner) cannot access the data of another user. Each user logs in
to the system using his/her Google credentials (username and password).
Once logged in, the users can access their applications as web applications
on the Chromium browser. When the user logs out, his/her cached data [8]
is encrypted using his/her credentials. Therefore, it is not possible for a
user to access another user’s data without decrypting it with the original
user’s credentials. All these activities take place at the front-end of the
system (Google account user domain) which is not tightly coupled with the
core of the system (kernel and rootfs). This design decision is to facilitate
the update or recovery of the core of the system without affecting the user
settings and data. More details on cached user data security is in Section 2.2.
On top of that, ChromiumOS employs a technique called verified boot [11]
that can check the system integrity between two boot sequences. This fea-
ture verifies the integrity of the rootfs to make sure that there was no in-
tended or unintended modification of it. Such modifications include but are
not limited to adding a malicious superuser to the rootfs and installation
of a rootkit or malware. Verification of the rootfs is very important from
security point of view, because as mentioned earlier, the front-end of the
system (Google account user domain) is not tightly coupled with the rootfs.
In other words, modification to the rootfs does not directly affect the user
settings in the front-end. Without any verification mechanism in place,
modifications to the rootfs can go undetected and users can be vulnerable
to the modifications. More on the details of the verified boot process is in
Section 2.4.
To identify such modifications, Chromium OS stores the verification in-
formation of the original rootfs with the bootloader and uses it to verify
the integrity of the rootfs during the next boot process. In the disk layout,
Chromium OS has 12 partitions (more details in Section 2.3). Partition 1 is
used to store encrypted user data as discussed earlier. Partition 3 contains
the rootfs. Partition 12 contains the kernel command line as well as rootfs
verification information. In the current verified boot process, the rootfs ver-
ification information stored in partition 12 is compared with the checksum
of the rootfs at partition 3. Also, the verified boot feature disables external
mounting of the rootfs partition (3) and the partition is read-only for added
security.
In this paper, we demonstrate techniques that a dedicated adversary can
exploit to take complete control over the rootfs bypassing the verified boot
process. In other words, the adversary can replace the original rootfs with
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his/her malicious rootfs using these techniques, but the rootfs verification
process will be unable to detect it. To realize these exploits, key challenges
that our proposed techniques overcome are: (i) how to enable the mount
option of partition 3 and (ii) how to gain read-write access to the partition.
We briefly summarize our techniques below:
1. Exploit 1 : Since the rootfs verification hash in partition 12 is in unen-
crypted form and can be manually modified, an adversary can mod-
ify the information to match any malicious rootfs replacing the origi-
nal rootfs at partition 3. More specifically, first the adversary builds
his/her own Chromium OS image and modifies the rootfs to contain a
malware. After that, the adversary overwrites the victim’s partition 3
and partition 12 using bit-by-bit copy [4] with his/her own (malicious)
partition 3 and partition 12. Using bit-by-bit copy, the adversary can
overcome the challenge of mounting the partition and gaining read-
write access.
2. Exploit 2 : An adversary with advanced technical know-how can edit
the victim’s rootfs partition using a hex editor [13] to remove the
information that blocks the mounting and read-write capability. Once
this is done, the adversary can mount the rootfs, remove verification
feature and install malware as with exploit 1.
How can the adversary extract useful information, such as encrypted
cached user data from the front-end (partition 1)? Once the adversary has
complete control over the rootfs, it can install a malware that will snoop a
user’s data once he/she logs in using Google credentials (note that at this
point, that particular user’s data is decrypted and exists in plaintext on
partition 1) and send it to a machine of adversary’s choice. Although we
only demonstrate this simple spyware for proof-of-concept, an adversary can
practically install much severe malware such as a keylogger to steal a wide
range of sensitive user information including online credentials.
How can this attack take place in a real usage scenario? Say, a user,
Alice, uses Chromium OS with verified boot support on her netbook [12].
One day, she forgets her netbook in the library (Figure 1). Attacker Eve
finds the netbook, takes the disk out, overwrites the original rootfs partition
with her tampered rootfs partition containing a spyware or keylogger. After
that, Eve puts the disk back and returns the netbook to the lost-and-found
section of the library. Alice picks up the netbook from lost-and-found, and
boots up the machine. Alice believes that if there is any modification of
the system, the verified boot will alert her. Since her netbook passes a
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Figure 1: Example scenario of the demonstrated attack
smooth boot process, Alice thinks that her system is intact and happily
starts using the machine. As soon as Alice starts using the machine, the
spyware installed by Eve is invoked and it starts covertly sending Alice’s
sensitive information to Eve.
On the flip side, another potential application of our technique could
be in digital forensic investigation. There were several recent incidents [7]
where law enforcement agencies had confiscated the computing/mobile de-
vice of the suspect, but couldn’t access it since the suspect was not pro-
viding the password (In the United States, the suspect can plea the Fifth
Amendment which protects against self-incrimination, including disclosure
of encryption keys in some cases). In such an event, where the suspect device
is a Chromium device, forensic investigators can acquire a court order [2] to
eavesdrop on the suspect’s communication using our proposed method.
Apart from demonstrating both the techniques, we also discuss how to
mitigate such scenarios. Our goal here is to notify the user about the rootfs
modification before he/she logs in to the system using Google credentials.
Also, the mitigation procedure should be fast enough to keep up with boot
time performance of Chromium OS. The general flow of our mitigation ap-
proach is the following: (i) the verification information of the rootfs is stored
in partition 1 in encrypted form and (ii) during the next boot, the user in-
vokes the verification script with decryption password which decrypts the
verification information and compares it with the information of the current
rootfs. This approach addresses both exploits discussed before. Because, in
the first exploit, where the original rootfs is completely overwritten, the ab-
sence of verification script functionality notifies the user of the modification.
In the second exploit, the script performs the verification as designed. Also,
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since the information is encrypted using a user supplied password, it can not
be easily manipulated. Further, all these verifications take place before the
user logs in using Google credentials. So, the per user cached data remains
secure in encrypted form in partition 1 while the verification takes place.
To summarize our contributions:
• We have demonstrated techniques that an adversary can utilize to by-
pass the verified boot security and steal encrypted user information.
These techniques have been experimentally tested on the all available
versions of Chromium OS (rootfs-verification-enabled base and devel-
oper versions). On the experimental platform, exploit 1 took 10.3
minutes whereas exploit 2 only took 53 seconds to bypass the verified
boot on an average.
• These exploits do not assume any knowledge about anyone on the user
(victim) machine and certainly do not require prior superuser privi-
lege on the user (victim) operating system with verified boot support.
These are also not specific to any hardware configuration and do not
make any assumption on the hardware of the user machine. Further,
these exploits do not disappear by simply rebooting the system. Note
that, many of the attacks described in the Chromium OS verified boot
design document are patched by reboot [11]
• Practical mitigation techniques are proposed and experimentally veri-
fied to make any modification of the rootfs evident to the user. On an
average, our mitigation techniques took 0.22 seconds to execute which
is very negligible (overall boot time is 10 seconds).
2 Chromium OS Overview
In this section, we briefly discuss different features of Chromium OS that
are pertinent to the exploit.
2.1 Software Architecture
Chromium OS has a simple software architecture. The front-end of the
system is the Google user domain which contains the browser, window man-
ager and web applications. The front-end is supported by the OS backend
(kernel and rootfs) which provides OS functionality and sits on top of the
hardware. A unique feature of Chromium OS is that the front-end of the
system is not tightly coupled with the backend of the system. For example,
per device system settings such as locale, WiFi settings and owner of the
system information are managed by the system backend. However, per user
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settings such as browser setting, account preferences, web applications and
autofill data are managed by the front-end of the system (after the user logs
in using his/her Google credentials) [10]. Due to this fact, it is possible to
share a Chromium device when protecting the confidentiality of each user’s
data which we discuss next. However, lack of tight coupling between the
Google user domain and rootfs domain also make it difficult to notice any
modifications in the underlying core of the system. Therefore, verification of
rootfs is an essential security feature for operating systems like Chromium
OS.
Hardware
Kernel & File System
Google User Domain (Browser and App)
Figure 2: Software architecture of Chromium OS
2.2 Protecting Cached User Data
Chromium OS allows multiple users to access a given device, but it doesn’t
allow data belonging to one user to be seen by other users. Consider a
Chromium OS device belonging to Alice. Bob, a friend of Alice, borrows
the device from Alice for sometime and performs online activity using his
Google credentials. Even though the device is owned by Alice, she has no
way to find out what files, or websites were accessed by Bob. Of course,
neither can Bob find out any data belonging to Alice.
To support this, Chromium OS encrypts the user’s data. More specif-
ically, it encrypts each user’s files in the home directory as well as cached
browser data (Figure 3). In addition, data created and maintained by plu-
gins and web applications are also encrypted.
In typical operating systems the root or administrative user (owner)
can access all the users’ files. Therefore, in the front-end (Google user
domain) Chromium OS enforces per-user encryption instead of just relying
on file ownership and access control to prevent users of a system to access
each other’s files. Encryption better suits this problem since the root or
administrative user would still have to recover the encryption keys to be
able to access the other user’s data. Technically, a unique vault directory
and keyset is assigned to a user at the first login using Google credentials.
6
The vault is nothing but an encrypted storage for a particular user data.
The keyset is tied to the user’s login credentials and is required to allow the
system to both retrieve and store information in the vault. When the user
logs in, the vault is open for access by the user. Therefore, if an attacker can
run a malware in the system when the user is logged in, it can have access
to all of user’s data in decrypted form. In this paper, we demonstrate that
such an attack is possible by modifying the rootfs and bypassing verified
boot.
2.3 Disk Format
ChromiumOS is a customized GNU/Linux distribution. Bootable Chromium
OS drives have a common drive format where the partition contents are as
shown in Table 1. Among these partitions, only partition 1, partition 3 and
partition 12 are relevant to our paper.
Table 1: GUID Partition Table of Chromium OS
Partition Usage Purpose
1 Cached user data User’s browsing history, downloads, cache, etc. Encrypted per-user
2 kernel A Initially installed kernel
3 rootfs A Initially installed rootfs
4 kernel B Alternate kernel, for use by automatic upgrades
5 rootfs B Alternate rootfs, for use by automatic upgrades
6 kernel C Minimal-size partition for future third kernel
7 rootfs C Minimal-size partition for future third rootfs. Same reasons as above
8 OEM customization Web pages, links, themes, etc. from OEM
9 reserved Minimal-size partition, for unknown future use
10 reserved Minimal-size partition, for unknown future use
11 reserved Minimal-size partition, for unknown future use
12 EFI System Partition Bootloader and rootfs verification info
Partition 1 mainly contains the user data in encrypted form as shown in
Figure 3. Partition 3 contains the rootfs (Figure 4).
Figure 3: Encrypted cached user data on partition 1
2.4 Verified Boot
The verified boot in Chromium OS ensures that users feel secure when log-
ging into a Chromium OS device. While Chromium OS doesn’t rule out the
possibility of successful attacks, verified boot is designed in such a way that
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Figure 4: rootfs on Partition 3
Figure 5: Different stages of verified boot
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an attack, once executed, won’t be persistent. When Chromium OS boots,
the state of the rootfs is verified and booting is allowed only if the state is
known to be good. Otherwise, a recovery or reinstall procedure is triggered,
which happens outside the usual modes used by attack vectors. The verified
boot is designed to detect any modifications in the file system. Also, for
added security, when rootfs verification is enabled, the rootfs partition is
read only and not externally mountable (Figure 6). The rootfs verification
Figure 6: Mount failure of partition 3 on Chromium OS with verified boot
mechanism takes place in three steps as shown in Figure 5. First, the rootfs
verification information such as hash is read from partition 12 (bootloader).
Next, the hash of the current rootfs (partition 3) is calculated. If these
two hashes match, the system proceeds, otherwise it throws an error (kernel
panic) and recovery is initiated.
However, the rootfs verification information at partition 12 is stored
in unencrypted form and it is possible to overwrite the rootfs verification
information to match a malicious rootfs replaced by adversary in partition
3.
3 Threat Model
There are two types of adversaries described by the Chromium OS threat
model:
• Opportunistic adversary: one who does not target any specific indi-
vidual or organization, but will try to gain access to any vulnerable
system available. Such an adversary will likely sniff network packets to
search for vulnerable hosts, or run websites which could execute mali-
cious code on the vulnerable system thus giving the adversary control
of the system.
• Dedicated adversary: one who targets only a specific individual or
organization with the explicit purpose of gaining access to or stealing
data from systems belonging to the latter. Such an adversary is even
9
Figure 7: Internals of verify rootfs checksum script
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ready to physically steal the device if needed, in addition to employing
conventional attacks in order to own the vulnerable OS.
Although verified boot process can detect if the rootfs has been modified,
it doesn’t prevent the original rootfs partition from being overwritten by a
malicious rootfs partition by a dedicated adversary.
4 Demonstrating Exploits
User Machine
Chromium OS
Attacker Machine
scp: Secure Copy
Figure 8: Machine setup for the exploit
For the purpose of demonstrating the exploits, we have built Chromium
OS images from the source code [6]. The build environment was a Ubuntu
10.04, 64 bit machine with root access and 12 GB RAM. Chromium OS can
be built in two modes: base and developer. The developer image has some
additional development packages compared to the base image. The exploits
described in this section section apply to both base and developer version
of Chromium OS.
As mentioned in the introduction, we demonstrate two techniques to
bypass the rootfs verification: The first technique is based on overwriting
the original rootfs with a malicious rootfs and the second technique is based
on removing the verification functionality from the original rootfs and then
installing the malware on it.
1. Overwriting the original rootfs:The core of the exploit is to overwrite
the rootfs partition (partition 3, Table 1) of a verified boot Chromium
image with a tampered (malicious) rootfs containing a spyware. There-
fore, the exploit can be divided into two major parts. First, the at-
tacker builds a Chromium OS image with no verified boot support
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(rootfs verification disabled) and installs the spyware on it. Next, the
adversary physically acquires the disk from the user machine contain-
ing Chromium OS with verified boot support and overwrites its rootfs
partition with the tampered rootfs prepared in the first phase. We
describe these phases in detail in the following sections.
Tampering the rootfs: It is possible to disable the rootfs verification
during Chromium OS image build process. We exploit this fact to
prepare the tampered rootfs partition containing the spyware for the
next phase.
• After building a Chromium OS image without enabling the veri-
fied boot, it was written to a disk. The disk containing Chromium
OS and cached user data is mounted to the adversary machine.
Figure 9: Disk with Chromium OS connected as an external drive
Figure 10: Adding a phony user with superuser privilege
• After mounting, the adversary can modify the rootfs (Figure 11)
chrooting to the partition and can add a phony user with the
superuser privilege (Figure 10). Next, we show how to overwrite
this tampered rootfs partition to a Chromium OS image with
verified boot support.
Replacing the rootfs on verified boot image: For this phase, the adver-
sary physically acquires the user disk containing Chromium OS with
verified boot support. However, the method to tamper the rootfs par-
tition described in the previous section does not work by default on
12
Figure 11: Modifying the rootfs on partition 3
Figure 12: Overwriting partition 3 on Chromium-verified boot with partition 3
with no verified boot support
Figure 13: Secure copy log of user machine shows the activity of spyware
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the Chromium OS image with verified boot support. Specifically, par-
tition 3, containing the rootfs, is not mountable, so the rootfs cannot
be accessed (Figure 6) by default. So, as long as the original rootfs
partition and bootloader are intact, the verified boot can detect tam-
pering with the contents of rootfs. But, if the rootfs partition and
bootloader are overwritten, the verified boot process is not capable of
detecting it. Based on this:
• The adversary can overwrite partition 3 of verified boot Chromium
OS with the tampered rootfs partition created in the previous
phase (Figure 12).
• It also overwrites partition 12 of the verified boot Chromium
OS with the adversary’s partition 12 where the verification is
disabled.
• Now, the adversary unmounts the system and boots into Chromium
OS and switches to the console mode by pressing (Ctrl+Alt+F2).
The adversary uses the phony credential to gain superuser priv-
ilege and sets up the following cron job at system startup which
will work as the spyware.
* * * * * scp /home/chronos/user/History
chronos@homelab.homeunix.org:.
The spyware will run in the background and copy a user’s cached
data (in this case, web browsing history) to a machine under the
adversary’s control. Figure 8 gives an overview of machine setups
for the exploit. More specifically, this command would Secure
Copy (scp) the logged in account user’s history file on the user
machine to the adversary machine homelab.homeunix.org (where
the adversary would have already enabled passwordless login) at
1 minute intervals.
• Once an unsuspecting user, say Alice, logged in with her Google
account on a device containing this tampered rootfs, the cron job
would start sending her history (or any other data as directed
by the adversary) to the adversary’s machine, without Alice ever
taking notice of it.
Figure 13 shows the scp log from the user machine showing the spy-
ware activity.
2. Disabling the rootfs verification feature: An adversary with advanced
technical know-how can disable the rootfs verification by physically
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modifying the partitions without overwriting them. Two advantages
of this approach over the previous exploit are that this approach is
much faster than the previous exploit of overwriting the rootfs and it is
stealthier than the previous one since this exploit preserves the system
level user accounts of the victim OS. For this exploit, an adversary,
Eve, does the following:
• Open victim’s rootfs in a hex editor (for e.g. hexcurse),
• Change the value at 0x467 from FF to 00,
Figure 14: Disabling the verification bits
• Save the file,
• Overwrite the device’s bootloader partition with a bootloader
partition obtained from another ChromiumOS image which doesn’t
contain any rootfs verification.
The resulting image consists of a rootfs which is under Eve’s control,
with rootfs verification being disabled while the original rootfs users
continue to exist on it.
Eve can chroot into this rootfs and add additional users and give them
superuser privileges, she can also boot the resulting image and install
spyware on it (as explained in the previous attack).
5 Mitigation
Our mitigation technique is centered around detecting modifications in the
bootloader and verification info. When the user, Alice, logs into her Google
account, all her files would be decrypted and available to the spyware on
a tampered device. Accordingly, an ideal mitigation technique should work
without requiring a login to Alice’s Google account.
Our mitigation techniques work from the system (backend) console with-
out requiring a login to a Google account. Once the image is built, Alice
runs the encrypt-bootloader (Figure15) script which creates an encrypted
copy of the bootloader configuration file using OpenSSL [1] and stores it in
partition 1. The encryption process uses a password provided by Alice. This
password should be ideally different from her Google account password and
her rootfs user password.
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Figure 15: Encrypting the contents of bootloader
When the device has been away from Alice’s possession for sometime,
she shouldn’t rule out the possibility of it being tampered with, and should
run the verify-integrity script to check for modifications.
Figure 16: Verifying the contents of bootloader
The verify-integrity (Figure 16) script does the following:
• Decrypt the encrypted bootloader using the password supplied while
encrypting it,
• Copy the bootloader stored in partition 12 by mounting partition 12
to /home/bootloader,
• Compare the checksum (SHA [3]) of the bootloaders,
– If the checksums match, the bootloader hasn’t been modified and
the rootfs integrity is verified,
– If not, then the bootloader has been modified and there is a pos-
sible modification of the rootfs.
• Delete the decrypted file and unmount partition 12.
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Discussion: Consider the adversary, Eve, getting access to a device con-
taining these mitigation scripts. If she performs exploit 1, the users on the
rootfs will get overwritten with Eve’s users, and Alice won’t be able to log in
to the rootfs at all, which is an indicator that her device has been tampered
with. If Eve performs exploit 2, then the original user accounts on the rootfs
will be preserved and Alice will still be able to login. Now, when the boot-
loader is modified, it’s checksum will be changed and will be detected by the
verify-integrity script when it’s run by Alice. Eve could also insert her
own encrypted bootloader in place of the original file. But this file won’t
be decrypted using Alice’s original password, which will also notify Alice of
possible modification. If Eve deletes the mitigation scripts, then the user
would notice the absence of these scripts and conclude that the device has
been tampered with.
Overhead : The overhead of our proposed mitigation technique is very
low in terms of required time to execute. The encrypt-bootloader script
takes 0.1 sec and the verify-integrity script takes 0.12 sec to execute
on an average. The timing is measured on a netbook with Intel Atom
N2600 1.60GHz with 1GB RAM. The overhead of the mitigation technique
is negligible and should not hinder a user’s experience of fast boot time in
a Chromium device.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated a vulnerability in ChromiumOS verified
boot process that enables a dedicated adversary to launch attacks targeting
sensitive user data. Although we have only demonstrated the installation of
a spyware to steal the cached user data, in practice a dedicated adversary
can also launch severe attacks such as installing a keylogger to steal more
sensitive user data such as password, credit card information and so on. Due
to the portable usage pattern of Chromium OS devices (netbooks or USB
disks), it is not difficult to analyze the practicality of the attack. While we
work towards the mitigation of the vulnerability at the source code level, we
hope that Chromium OS will go through more rigorous security analysis by
the community.
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